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AbstrACt
Introduction Obesity is a major public health challenge 
and exacerbates economic disparities through employment 
discrimination and increased personal health expenditures. 
Financial incentives for weight management may intensify 
individuals’ utilisation of evidence-based behavioural 
strategies while addressing obesity-related economic 
disparities in low-income populations. Trials have focused 
on testing incentives contingent on achieving weight loss 
outcomes. However, based on social cognitive and self-
determination theories, providing incentives for achieving 
intermediate behavioural goals may be more sustainable 
than incentivising outcomes if they enhance an individual’s 
skills and self-efficacy for maintaining long-term weight 
loss. The objective of this paper is to describe the 
rationale and design of the Financial Incentives foR Weight 
Reduction study, a randomised controlled trial to test the 
comparative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of two 
financial incentive strategies for weight loss (goal directed 
vs outcome based) among low-income adults with obesity, 
as well as compared with the provision of health behaviour 
change resources alone.
Methods and analysis We are recruiting 795 adults, 
aged 18–70 years with a body mass index ≥30 kg/
m2, from three primary care clinics serving residents of 
socioeconomically disadvantaged neighbourhoods in 
New York City and Los Angeles. All participants receive a 
1-year commercial weight loss programme membership, 
self-monitoring tools (bathroom scale, food journal and 
Fitbit Alta HR), health education and monthly check-in 
visits. In addition to these resources, those in the two 
intervention groups can earn up to $750 over 6 months 
for: (1) participating in an intensive weight management 
programme, self-monitoring weight and diet and meeting 
physical activity guidelines (goal-directed arm); or (2) a 
≥1.5% to ≥5% reduction in baseline weight (outcome-
based arm). To maximise incentive efficacy, we incorporate 
concepts from behavioural economics, including 
immediacy of payments and framing feedback to elicit 
regret aversion. We will use generalised mixed effect 
models for repeated measures to examine intervention 
effects on weight at 6, 9 and 12 months.
Ethics and dissemination Human research protection 
committees at New York University School of Medicine, 
University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) David Geffen 
School of Medicine and Olive-View–UCLA Medical Center 
granted ethics approval. We will disseminate the results 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This three-arm randomised controlled trial com-
pares the impact of two financial incentives strate-
gies on a ≥5% reduction in body weight at 6 months 
among primary care patients from socioeconomical-
ly disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
 ► Comparing goal-directed versus outcome-based 
financial incentives is important because it direct-
ly addresses outstanding questions about how to 
structure financial incentive interventions optimally.
 ► The intervention design leverages principles of be-
havioural economics to connect patients with exist-
ing clinic and community resources and intensify 
utilisation of evidence-based behavioural strategies 
for weight loss.
 ► Patients in all three arms receive substantial re-
sources, including weight  loss programme mem-
bership, bathroom scale, food journal, Fitbit Alta HR 
and monthly in-person visits, which may reduce our 
ability to detect the marginal value of the financial 
incentives.
 ► We anticipate that the results will inform the design 
of scalable financial incentive programmes to ad-
dress obesity in public and private health systems.
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of this research via peer-reviewed publications, conference presentations 
and meetings with stakeholders.
trial registration number NCT03157713.
IntroduCtIon
The prevalence of obesity among US adults is 40% and 
continues to rise, contributing substantially to morbidity 
and mortality from obesity-related illnesses such as 
diabetes, heart disease, stroke and cancer.1–3 Obesity 
prevalence among UK adults is 26%, the highest of Euro-
pean countries.4 5 Obesity is more prevalent among adults 
with a lower socioeconomic status.6 Because individuals 
with obesity also face social stigma, including employ-
ment discrimination and bias in educational settings,7 
the increased prevalence of obesity among lower income 
individuals exacerbates health and socioeconomic dispar-
ities. Moreover, the negative externalities of obesity 
include an attributable annual US healthcare cost of 
$147 billion, including services provided by both public 
and private payers for inpatient care, non-inpatient care 
and prescription drugs.8 The UK National Health Service 
spent an estimated £6.1 billion on overweight and obesi-
ty-related illness in 2014–2015, with societal costs esti-
mated at £27 billion.9 
The US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) 
recommends universal obesity screening in healthcare 
settings and intensive, multicomponent behavioural inter-
ventions for adults with obesity.10 11 However, national 
data show that physicians often do not provide nutri-
tion, exercise or weight loss counselling for patients with 
obesity.12 Moreover, 51% of US adults report wanting to 
lose weight, but only half are actively trying, and an even 
smaller proportion use evidence-based methods.12–15 A 
reduction in weight of as little as 5% is associated with 
cardiovascular health benefits.16–18 It is therefore critical 
to identify novel approaches to increase utilisation of 
effective, evidence-based behaviour change strategies and 
weight management programmes (eg, Weight Watchers, 
the Diabetes Prevention Program and the Veterans 
Affairs MOVE! Program19–21) to promote weight loss and 
improve health outcomes, particularly among socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged individuals. Financial incentives 
are a potential bridge to increasing utilisation of effective 
weight management behaviours and programmes among 
low-income adults with obesity.22
Health insurers, employers and government agencies 
are testing the extent to which financial incentive strat-
egies motivate changes in health behaviour, particularly 
for obesity and smoking.23 24 Microeconomic theory 
suggests that financial incentives lead to weight loss 
because individuals are influenced by the prospect of 
rewards. This effect may be enhanced when the incentive 
design emphasises immediacy (payments provided as soon 
as possible), so that individuals can more readily associate 
a payment with the behaviour that triggered it,25 26 and 
regret aversion (avoidance of regret from losing an antic-
ipated reward).27 28 While some theories of motivation 
have led researchers to raise concerns about the long-
term durability of the extrinsic effects of incentives,29 
studies have shown that incentives may promote interme-
diate-to-long-term weight loss.29–37 Despite these findings, 
a key unanswered question is what targets to incentivise.38
Incentivising an individual’s participation in goal-di-
rected, evidence-based behaviours for weight loss, such 
as participating in a weight management programme, 
self-monitoring weight and diet and achieving physical 
activity goals, may be more sustainable than incentivising 
outcome-based attainment of weight loss, since goal-directed 
financial incentives are designed to encourage individ-
uals to develop specific skills for maintaining weight loss 
long term. In addition, attainment of behavioural goals 
precedes weight loss outcomes, thereby providing earlier 
opportunities for success, which may increase self-efficacy 
and intrinsic motivation for weight management.39 Based 
on social cognitive theory,40 incentivising behavioural 
practice directly may help patients build the self-efficacy to 
engage in evidence-based strategies and maintain these 
behaviours even after an incentive is removed. Self-deter-
mination theory41 highlights the role that intrinsic moti-
vation may play in an individual’s sustained behaviour 
change, since engaging in a strategy he or she has mastered 
can provide satisfaction and enjoyment (figure 1).
To date, financial incentive interventions for weight 
loss have favoured outcome-based over goal-directed 
incentive designs. In general, outcome-based designs 
have been shown to promote weight loss during the 
intervention period, though few studies have resulted 
in significant long-term weight loss, when this outcome 
was measured.42–44 For example, in a 32-week trial among 
Veterans with obesity, net weight loss between the incen-
tive and control groups was no longer significant 36 weeks 
postintervention.45 Based on social cognitive and self-de-
termination theories described above, goal-directed 
incentives may promote short-term weight maintenance. 
Even if goal-directed incentives do not sustain weight loss, 
they likely are more effective than outcome-based incen-
tives at promoting health behaviours, such as physical 
activity,46 that are associated with decreased morbidity 
and mortality.
Further research is needed to test whether the effec-
tiveness of financial incentives for weight loss that incor-
porate immediacy and regret aversion can be maximised 
by targeting utilisation of effective weight management 
behaviours and programmes. Studies are also needed 
to assess the economic sustainability of financial incen-
tives, which is a major factor in public and private deci-
sion making.47 The primary aim of the Financial Incentives 
foR Weight Reduction  (FIReWoRk) study is to compare 
the effectiveness of goal-directed versus outcome-based 
financial incentives on ≥5% wt loss among patients with 
obesity living in socioeconomically disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods, as well as compared with the provision of 
health behaviour change resources alone. Financial 
Incentives foR Weight Reduction (FIReWoRk) also exam-
ines the impact of these interventions on patients’ use 
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of evidence-based weight management programmes, 
waist circumference, blood pressure and quality of life. 
A secondary aim is to examine the cost-effectiveness of 
using goal-directed incentives to promote weight loss as 
compared with outcome-based incentives or resources 
without incentives. The purpose of this paper is to 
describe the rationale and design of the FIReWoRk study.
MEthods And AnAlysEs
study overview and design
The FIReWoRk study is a three-arm randomised controlled 
trial to compare the effectiveness of three approaches to 
weight loss among primary care patients with obesity. 
Patients usually achieve maximum weight loss during the 
first 6 months of a behavioural intervention.48 Thus, our 
primary outcome is a ≥5% reduction in baseline weight 
at 6 months. Our primary hypothesis is that a greater 
proportion of participants in the goal-directed incen-
tives arm will obtain a ≥5% reduction in baseline weight 
at 6 months than in the outcome-based incentives arm or 
the resources-only arm. Our secondary hypothesis is that 
a greater proportion of participants in the goal-directed 
arm will maintain a ≥5% reduction in baseline weight at 
12 months than in the outcome-based arm or the resourc-
es-only arm. We are enrolling adults living in socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged neighbourhoods from three 
medical centres that serve predominately low-income 
populations. Participants in all three study arms receive 
a 1 year commercial weight loss programme membership, 
self-monitoring tools (bathroom scale, food journal and 
Fitbit Alta HR), health education and monthly, in-clinic 
check-in visits. In addition, participants in the outcome-
based incentives arm can earn up to $750 over 6 months 
for a 1.5%–5% reduction in baseline weight, while those 
in the goal-directed incentive arm can earn the same 
amount for engaging in the following evidence-based 
weight loss behaviours: weight management programme 
participation, self-monitoring weight and diet, and phys-
ical activity.
Primary care clinics and patients
We are recruiting patients exclusively from three primary 
care clinics in New York City (NYC) and Los Angeles 
(LA), with plans to enrol 795 adults with obesity from 
low-income neighbourhoods. The clinics are part of NYC 
Health+Hospitals – Bellevue, Sunset Park Family Health 
Center at NYU Langone Hospital – Brooklyn and Olive 
View UCLA Medical Center. Bellevue Hospital is the flag-
ship hospital for the largest public health care system 
in the nation. There are approximately 60 000 outpa-
tient visits in Bellevue’s adult primary care clinic each 
year. Family Health Centers at NYU Langone is one of 
the largest Federally Qualified Health Center networks 
in the nation. Its network of eight primary care and 
specialty sites handles over 600 000 visits annually. Olive 
View UCLA Medical Center is operated by the LA County 
Department of Health Services, which supports a network 
of hospitals and primary care clinics in and around the 
LA metro area. More than half of Olive View patients are 
underinsured or uninsured. All locations serve racially/
ethnically diverse, medically underserved populations 
in which the prevalence of obesity is above the national 
average.
Figure 1 FIReWoRk conceptual model. FIReWoRk, Financial Incentives foR Weight Reduction. 
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Each of these hospitals uses an electronic health 
record (EHR) system that captures detailed inpatient 
and outpatient information. We conduct EHR queries 
every 6 months to identify patients with obesity who 
have seen a provider in the previous 2 years. To identify 
patients with obesity who live in socioeconomically disad-
vantaged neighbourhoods, we cross-reference patients’ 
address information from their EHR with census tracts 
associated with the lowest 40% of 2015 median house-
hold income in the NYC/Tri-State and LA County areas 
(approximately <$40 000 per year).49 Because we are 
recruiting from neighbourhoods with a higher propor-
tion of minority residents and from low-income census 
tracts, we anticipate that our sample will have a higher 
proportion of ethnic and racial minorities, particularly 
Hispanic/Latinos than is reflected in the general popula-
tion. We approach recruitment in ways shown previously 
to potentially reduce burden and enhance trust among 
prospective participants who are racial/ethnic minorities 
and live in low-income neighbourhoods.50 51 Examples 
include recruiting from racial/ethnic minority-serving 
medical centres, hiring English–Spanish bilingual and 
racially/ethnically diverse research staff, providing infor-
mation about the study in the patient’s native language, 
compensating participants for completing study visits and 
collecting contact information for at least one relative or 
friend.
As a primary recruitment method, we mail announce-
ments about the study to the homes of patients identi-
fied via the EHR and neighbourhood queries and invite 
them to contact us. We follow-up with patients by phone, 
beginning when we expect the mailing to arrive and 
continuing until completing four outreach attempts. 
We also identify upcoming primary care appointments 
of patients identified via the queries, at which time we 
approach them in waiting rooms with information about 
the study. We schedule interested patients who pass an 
eligibility screening for a baseline visit at or near their 
home medical centre within 1 month of their screening 
date. No more than one person per household is eligible 
to participate. As secondary recruitment methods, we 
communicate with primary care physicians and medical 
residents at the study sites who may be willing to refer 
their patients to the study. There is also a physician within 
each clinic willing to ‘champion’ the study by reminding 
providers to refer their patients, answering questions and 
providing study updates. We regularly post recruitment 
flyers and brochures in areas of the clinic frequented by 
patients.
sample size
Prior studies suggest that among patients with obesity, 
the prevalence of obtaining a 5% reduction in baseline 
weight by 6 months is 10%–35%.52–55 Thus, we assume 
an absolute difference (rate2–rate1) of approximately 10 
percentage points in rates of obtaining a 5% reduction in 
baseline weight by 6 months between the two incentives 
arms (24% and 14% of participants obtaining a 5% wt 
reduction in the goal-directed and outcome-based inter-
vention arms, respectively). Therefore, 241 participants 
per group provides at least 80% power to detect a mean-
ingful difference in weight loss between the goal-directed 
and outcome-based intervention arms with a type I error 
rate α=0.05. It also provides at least 99% power to detect a 
meaningful difference in weight loss between the goal-di-
rected incentives and resources-only arms (24% and 
10% of participants obtaining a 5% wt reduction in the 
goal-directed incentives and resources-only arms, respec-
tively) with a type I error rate α=0.05. Since there is only 
one primary hypothesis, there is no multiple comparison 
adjustment in the sample size calculation. We also assume 
a 6-month loss-to-follow-up rate of 10%; therefore, we will 
enrol an additional 72 patients for a total sample size of 
795.
Eligibility and enrolment
We include patients with a body mass index ≥30 kg/m2, 
who are 18–70 years old, speak English or Spanish, have 
seen their physician within the past 2 years, have an active 
US mobile or home phone number and address and live 
in a qualifying census tract. Patients who weigh >172 kg 
are not enrolled, as the HealthOMeter 349KLX Digital 
Medical Weight Scale is only valid up to 181 kg and we 
allow for a 9-kg buffer in case weight gain occurs. We 
exclude patients who have had a weight loss surgery or 
procedure in the previous 2 years or have experienced 
any of the following in the previous 6 months: ≥4.5 kg 
weight loss, completion of an intensive weight manage-
ment programme, active psychosis and/or other cogni-
tive issues, metastatic cancer or incidence of a myocardial 
infarction or stroke. We also exclude patients who report 
abuse of alcohol, have a history of disordered eating, have 
stage V chronic kidney disease or end-stage renal disease, 
are pregnant or breast feeding, plan to become pregnant 
or plan to move out of NYC/Tri-State or LA County area 
in the following 12 months.
Once screened by phone, we invite eligible patients to 
a baseline study visit at their home medical centre and 
obtain informed consent. To provide informed consent, 
we: (1) describe the study and its risks and benefits in 
detail from a script tested for eighth grade reading 
comprehension, (2) assess comprehension by asking the 
patient to explain the information presented (teach-back 
method56), (3) answer questions about the study and/
or consent forms, (4) offer the opportunity to partici-
pate and (5) obtain the patient’s signature on the consent 
form.57 The participant receives a copy of the signed 
consent form by email.
randomisation
Randomisation occurs after obtaining informed consent, 
completing initial weight measures, administering the 
baseline survey instrument and providing weight manage-
ment programme referrals, health education materials 
and self-monitoring tools. Participants are randomised to 
one of three study arms: (1) outcome-based incentives, (2) 
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goal-directed incentives or (3) resources only (figure 2). 
To ensure comparable group sample sizes, we randomise 
eligible patients in block sizes of four or six at random 
using a random number generator in R ( www. r- project. 
org). We stratify randomisation by study site and partici-
pant’s self-reported preference for an outcome-based or 
goal-directed financial incentive programme for weight 
loss in order to ensure that both intervention groups 
contain an equal number of participants preferring each 
incentive type. Stratified randomisation also prevents 
imbalance between treatment groups by hospital site.
Financial incentives intervention for weight loss
Interventionists: trained research coordinators or 
research assistants (RAs) conduct all study visits. RAs are 
students or graduates of health-related disciplines such 
as biomedicine, public health, health promotion, educa-
tion, psychology, kinesiology and nutrition. To promote 
enrolment of Spanish-speaking patients, RAs are required 
to have full native or professional Spanish proficiency. 
RAs receive at least 20 hours of standardised training 
in the responsible conduct of research, study proto-
cols and cultural sensitivity. RAs observe and role play 
a series of study visits in both English and Spanish and 
can successfully demonstrate intervention delivery before 
conducting study visits.
Baseline study visit: at a 2.5–hour initial study visit, all 
participants receive a list of local weight management 
programmes that meet criteria for a high-intensity, on-site, 
multicomponent lifestyle intervention58 and a voucher 
for 1 year of WW Freestyle (formerly Weight Watchers) 
membership (total value approximately US$310).20 
Participants can choose to attend a commercial, medical 
or community-based weight management programme 
that is offered at least twice monthly and meets guidelines 
for an intensive comprehensive lifestyle intervention.58 
The RA communicates that the goal is for the partici-
pant to register and actively participate in at least 50% 
of weekly programme sessions per month (or a compa-
rable rate associated with evidence-based weight loss). All 
participants also receive self-monitoring instructions and 
tools59–61 including a bathroom scale, a BookFactory food 
journal and a Fitbit Alta HR wearable fitness tracker (total 
value approximately US$170).62 The RA communicates 
that the goals are for the participant to weigh themselves 
at least 3 days per week, to record what and how much 
they eat at least 5 days per week and accumulate at least 
75 physical activity minutes per week (which increases to 
150 min per week after 3 months to approximate physical 
activity guidelines63). The behavioural science construct 
of emergency reserves informs how the RA frames the goals; 
for example, the RA encourages the participant to ‘track 
what you eat every day, but you have two emergency “skip 
days” per week if you fall behind’. Goals with emergency 
reserves are perceived as more attainable and lead to 
increased goal persistence.64 The RA also communicates 
that the participant is to lose ≥2.5% of their baseline 
weight by 1 month and ≥5% by 2 months and provides 
their weight in pounds for each target. The RA commu-
nicates each behavioural goal and weight loss outcome 
both verbally and in writing, and then asks for the partici-
pant’s understanding using the teach-back method.56 The 
RA also discusses how to prevent relapse.59 The RA then 
explains what documentation participants must provide 
to verify their goal attainment at subsequent study visits. 
In addition, participants receive health education and 
handouts on food types to incorporate and which to limit, 
portion sizes, healthy recipe ideas and moderate-intensity 
physical activity. The RA also assists the participant in 
setting up their Fitbit device and online Fitbit and WW 
Freestyle accounts so that they can access the features 
available through their smartphone or computer.
Outcome-based incentives: if a participant is randomised 
to an intervention arm, the RA informs them of the 
behavioural goals or weight loss outcomes for which they 
earn incentives, the amounts they are incentivised and 
how they receive their payments. Participants randomised 
to receive outcome-based incentives can earn up to $750 
over 6 months for losing ≥1.5% to ≥5% of their baseline 
weight, as confirmed at monthly weigh-ins. At 1 month, 
they receive $50 if they lose ≥1.5% to <2.5% or $100 if 
they lose ≥2.5%. The weight loss outcomes at 1 month 
are more modest to discourage overly rapid weight loss. 
At 2 and 3 months, they receive $50 if they lose ≥2.5% to 
<5% or $100 if they lose ≥5% of their baseline weight. At 
4, 5 and 6 months, they receive $100 if they lose ≥2.5% to 
<5% or $150 if they lose ≥5% of their baseline weight 
(table 1). The maximum value of each incentive interven-
tion is approximately US$1230 (US$750 plus the US$480 
financial value of the control intervention).
Goal-directed incentives: participants randomised to 
goal-directed incentives do not earn money for losing 
weight but instead earn up to $750 over 6 months for 
meeting goals to participate in an approved comprehen-
sive lifestyle intervention, meet physical activity guide-
lines and self-monitor weight and diet. At 1–6 months, 
they receive a one-time $150 for registration and atten-
dance at ≥50% of weekly weight management programme 
Figure 2 Patient randomisation to study groups.
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sessions, as verified with documentation from the sessions 
such as an agenda or weight log or by a record of atten-
dance in the participant’s EHR, if available. They continue 
to receive $60 monthly thereafter for attendance at ≥50% 
of weekly programme sessions (or a comparable rate asso-
ciated with evidence-based weight loss). At 1–3 months, 
they receive up to $20 for achieving 75 min of physical 
activity per week ($5 per week), as verified using active 
minutes data collected in the participant’s Fitbit account. 
At 4–6 months, they must achieve 150 min of physical 
activity per week to receive up to $20. At 1–6 months, they 
receive up to $20 for using their food journal 5 days per 
week ($5 per week) and recording their body weight 3 
days per week ($2.50 per week), as verified by RA review 
of their entries (table 1). Participants receive incentives 
for multiple behaviours and strategies because of the 
necessity of a multicomponent approach for successful 
weight management. One drawback of this approach is 
that we may be unable to determine the relative impact of 
each behaviour and strategy on weight loss. Incentives are 
highest for participation in a comprehensive lifestyle inter-
vention such as WW Freestyle because attendance in such 
programmes has been shown to lead to clinically signifi-
cant weight loss,11 58 as has engaging in physical activity 
and self-monitoring diet and weight (considered markers 
of engagement in WW Freestyle). However, we recognise 
not everyone can or will participate in a programme. 
Thus, participants also receive incentives for engaging in 
evidence-based weight management behaviours and strat-
egies outside of an approved programme.
Check-in study visits: in-clinic check-in visits occur 
monthly at 1–6 months, proceeded by follow-up visits at 9 
and 12 months. During check-in visits, RAs measure weight 
and waist circumference. The RA also troubleshoots any 
technology-related issues that arise with the participant’s 
Fitbit or WW Freestyle membership. The majority of the 
30–45 min visit is devoted to verifying whether participants 
met their behavioural goals and weight loss outcome and 
providing them with feedback on their progress. For the 
resources-only group, the RA provides words of encour-
agement for meeting a behavioural goal or weight loss 
outcome (eg, ‘Great job!’). If the participant did not 
meet a goal or outcome, the RA states, ‘if you had done x, 
you would have met this goal’. For the goal-directed and 
outcome-based groups, the RA provides words of encour-
agement for meeting a behavioural goal or weight loss 
outcome and informs them of incentive amounts earned. 
If the participant did not meet a goal or outcome, the 
RA states, ‘if you had done x, you could have earned x 
amount’, using framing that leverages regret aversion. We 
considered using more frequent (eg, weekly) incentive 
payments; however, we opted to minimise the participant 
Table 1 Financial incentives awarded for meeting monthly behavioural goals and weight loss outcomes
Time point
Goal-directed 
incentives*
Outcome-based 
incentives
Behavioural goals
  Enrolment and active participation† in an evidence-based‡ 
weight management programme
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 months $150 $0
  Active participation† in an evidence-based‡ 
weight management programme
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 months $60 $0
  Food journal use§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 months $20 $0
  Achievement of ≥75 min of physical activity per week 1, 2 and 3 months $20 $0
  Achievement of ≥150 min of physical activity per week¶ 4, 5 and 6 months $20 $0
  Self-weighing** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 months $10 $0
Weight loss outcomes
  Weight loss (≥1.5% to ≥2.5%) 1 month $0 $50–$100††
  Weight loss (≥2.5% to ≥5%) 2 and 3 months $0 $50–$100‡‡
  Weight loss (≥2.5% to ≥5%) 4, 5 and 6 months $0 $100–$150§§
Total incentives (maximum) $750 $750
*Incentive is proportional to the number of weeks in the previous 28 days this goal is met (eg, incentive may range from $5 for 1 week to $20 
for 4 weeks).
†Attending ≥2 sessions per month or ≥50% of sessions monthly, whichever is greater.
‡Programme participation goal is based on established American Heart Association/American College of Cardiology/The Obesity Society 
guidelines for the management of overweight and obesity in adults.
§Recording diet content and quantity ≥5 days per week.
¶Physical activity goal is based on established public health guidelines for moderate-vigorous intensity physical activity in adults.
**Recording weight ≥3 days per week.
††$50 for losing ≥1.5% to <2.5% and $100 for losing ≥2.5% of baseline weight.
‡‡$50 for losing ≥2.5% to <5% and $100 for losing ≥5% of baseline weight.
§§$100 for losing ≥2.5% to <5% and $150 for losing ≥5% of baseline weight.
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burden of weekly in-person or remote weigh-ins to verify 
goal attainment and adhere to an intensity (ie, monthly) 
more translatable to a real-world setting. After the RA 
verifies the participant’s goal attainment, the RA commu-
nicates the incentive amount earned but does not provide 
payment during the visit. Immediately after the visit, the 
RA initiates payment via a secure prepaid debit card system 
called ClinCard (2016 Greenphire). Incentives are avail-
able to participants via their ClinCard within 24–48 hours 
after goal verification. We inform participants during the 
consenting process that if they earn US$600 or more in a 
calendar year, they will receive the appropriate tax form 
to report their income as well as compensation to offset 
any tax liability. Participants do not invest any of their 
own money at any time, nor do the incentives incorporate 
a lottery structure.
Intervention standardisation and fidelity
We implement fidelity monitoring procedures to ensure 
that the delivery of intervention components is standard 
across all study sites and RAs. All RAs complete a task list 
at each study visit. A portion of study visits are audio-re-
corded, and recorded sessions are randomly selected for 
audit using a fidelity-monitoring checklist. RAs who score 
less than 80% on an audit receive remedial training and 
are required to demonstrate the unattained standard 
prior to resuming study visits.65
Participant retention strategies
At the end of each check-in visit, RAs schedule partici-
pants for their next visit and place a text message within 
7 days and a phone call within 2 days prior to their sched-
uled visit to encourage them to return. To increase partic-
ipation and minimise attrition, all participants receive a 
total payment for participation of up to US$180 ($20 per 
visit) for their time and travel, independent of incentives 
earned in the intervention groups. We also provide partic-
ipants with periodic tokens of appreciation, including a 
button with the study logo after their 3-month visit and a 
thank you text message after their 6-month and 9-month 
visits.50 In addition, we conduct a process evaluation to 
explore differences in participant retention and uptake 
of intervention components (eg, self-weighing and 
Fitbit wear) by study arm, hospital site and prespecified 
subgroups (women, Black and Hispanic). We also explore 
participants’ experiences interacting with the interven-
tion components using a semistructured interview at 6 
months. The process evaluation allows us to assess reasons 
the intervention may or may not have the intended effects 
and to improve the acceptability of future interventions. 
If participants do not return for their check-in visits, we 
attempt to contact them by phone to assess their reasons 
for leaving the study.
data collection and measures
Assessments occur at baseline, 30 days and 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
9 and 12 months (table 2). Our primary outcome is the 
percentage of patients who achieve a >5% reduction in 
baseline weight at 6 months, an amount considered clin-
ically significant for overweight/obese adults because 
of its associated reductions in cardiometabolic risk.16 17 
We also will assess the percentage of patients who main-
tain a >5% reduction in baseline weight at 6 months 
and compare mean weight loss achieved in each group 
at 6 months and 12 months. Our secondary outcomes 
include weight management programme attendance, 
waist circumference, blood pressure and quality of life. 
At baseline, we confirm contact information; collect 
demographic characteristics; measure height, weight and 
blood pressure; take a brief medical history; and admin-
ister survey instruments about diet composition, phys-
ical activity, theoretical mechanisms of health behaviour 
change, financial well-being and quality of life. The survey 
is interviewer administered in the participant’s preferred 
language (English or Spanish). Participants are assured 
there are ‘no right or wrong answers’ and to ‘answer as 
honestly as possible’. At 1–6 month check-in visits, we 
assess adherence to a weight management programme, 
self-monitoring of weight and diet and physical activity. 
We administer weight, blood pressure and the survey 
instruments again at 6 months (primary outcome time 
point), 9 months and 12 months. At 6, 9 and 12 months, 
we also ask participants about hospitalisations and emer-
gency room visits and use of medications that may modify 
weight (eg, metformin, insulin, antidepressants and 
so on).66 Whenever possible at 6, 9 and 12 months, an 
RA who has not met regularly with the participant and 
who is unaware of their study arm assignment adminis-
ters the biometric assessments and survey interviews and 
enters the results into REDCap 7.4.23, a secure web-based 
application. All biometric procedures are adapted from 
the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 
(NHANES),67 and survey measures are selected based on 
their validity against an established criterion, and valida-
tion with Spanish-speaking adults, when available.
Weight and height: weight is measured in pounds twice 
to the nearest 0.1 pound using a HealthOMeter 349KLX 
Digital Medical Weight Scale. We ask the participant 
to remove shoes and heavy garments and to stand still 
with both feet in the centre of the scale, hands at sides, 
looking straight ahead. If the first two weights differ by 
0.5 pound or more, we repeat the measure once and take 
the average of the two measures closest in value. Height is 
measured once, rounded up to the nearest 0.1 cm, using 
a SECA 213 Portable Stadiometer. We ask the participant 
to remove shoes and extraneous clothing and undo inter-
fering hairstyles, then to stand upright looking straight 
ahead with heels, buttocks, shoulder blades and back of 
head positioned against the ruler.
Waist circumference: waist circumference is measured 
twice, rounding down to the nearest 0.25 inch. We take 
the measurement on bare skin if possible, at the high 
point of the iliac crests, drawing the tape measure snug 
at minimal respiration. If the first two values differ by 0.5 
inch or more, we repeat the measure once, and take the 
average of the two measures closest in value.
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Blood pressure: two resting blood pressure measures 
are obtained using the Omron HEM 907XL IntelliSense 
Professional Digital Blood Pressure Monitor, an auto-
mated sphygmomanometer. The participant remains 
seated without consuming caffeine or nicotine for 30 min 
prior to the measurement. We measure arm circumfer-
ence first to determine the appropriate cuff size, then 
place the cuff snugly on the left upper arm with the 
bottom of the cuff approximately 2.5 cm above the inner 
elbow. The arm rests palm-up at heart level, and the 
participant remains silent and still, with both feet on the 
floor, during the measurement.68 If the first two systolic or 
diastolic values differ by 5.0 mm Hg or more, we remove 
and adjust the cuff, repeat the two measures and take the 
average of the subsequent two measures that do not differ 
by 5.0 mm Hg or more.
Lipids and haemoglobin A1c: fasting lipids (high-den-
sity and low-density lipoprotein cholesterol, triglycerides 
and total cholesterol) and haemoglobin A1c values from 
a 12-month period prior to baseline are accessed via the 
participant’s EHR. Since these tests are clinically indi-
cated for patients with obesity, we also recommend that 
they obtain them at the conclusion of the 6-month inter-
vention period. We access available values a second time 
from a 12-month period following the conclusion of the 
6-month intervention period.
Quality of life: the 29-item Patient-Reported Outcomes 
Measurement Information System (PROMIS-29) is 
used to assess physical, mental and social health.69 The 
PROMIS-29 measures eight domains (fatigue, pain inten-
sity, pain interference, physical function, sleep distur-
bance, anxiety, depression and ability to participate in 
social roles and activities) and yields a composite global 
health score. The PROMIS-29 is applicable to the general 
population, as well as to ethnically and sociodemograph-
ically diverse groups and to those with chronic health 
conditions. Substantial evidence supports the validity of 
the PROMIS-29.69 70 In addition, the seven-item Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) is used 
to assess how often a participant felt depressive symptoms 
Table 2 Study measures and assessment time points
Measure Baseline 1–5 months 6 and 9 months 12 months
Survey measures
  Sociodemographics X
  Chronic health conditions X
  Incentives preferences X
  Quality of life X X X
  Healthy dietary changes X X X
  Fruits and vegetables X X X
  Sweets and salty snacks X X X
  Sugar-sweetened beverages X X X
  Physical activity X X X
  Self-efficacy X X X
  Outcome expectations X X X
  Intrinsic motivation X X X
  Financial well-being X X X
  Weight loss programme attendance X X X
  Self-monitoring X X X X
  Alcohol and tobacco use X X
  Hospitalisations and emergency room 
visits
X X
  Adverse events X X X
Other measures
  Height X
  Weight X X X X
  Waist circumference X X X X
  Blood pressure X X X
  Fitbit active minutes X X X
  Lipids X X
  Haemoglobin A1c X X
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during the past week (1=never, 2=hardly ever, 3=some 
of the time, 4=most of the time). The CES-D has shown 
adequate reliability and validity in general population 
samples with a range of demographic characteristics.71–74
Incentive programme preferences: using an item 
adapted from the Financial Incentives for Smoking Treat-
ment study ( ClinicalTrials. gov identifier NCT02506829), 
the RA describes two hypothetical financial incen-
tive programmes for weight loss (one is goal directed 
and the other is outcome based), and then asks which 
programme the participant prefers. This question allows 
us to test whether participants who are randomised to 
an incentive structure consistent with their prespecified 
incentive programme preference are more likely to lose 
weight than those who are randomised to incentives that 
are inconsistent with their preference. To understand 
the participant’s programme choice, the RA asks open-
ended questions to assess the reasons why the participant 
chose the programme they did and what concerns about 
the programme they have, as well as open-ended items 
adapted from the Health Incentive Program Question-
naire75 to prompt the participant to describe their reac-
tions to receiving payment for losing weight.
Food behaviour: we assess healthy dietary changes in 
portion sizes and food choices such as fried food, fast 
food and white bread using the Latino Dietary Behaviors 
Questionnaire (LDBQ). This subscale reflects a pattern 
of dietary behaviours associated with healthier micronu-
trients and lower calories.76 Fruit and vegetable consump-
tion is measured using a seven-item subscale from the 
validated Food Behavior Checklist.77 We adapted two 
items from the Rapid Eating Assessment for Participants 
– Shortened Version to assess consumption of sweets and 
salty snacks.78 79 The LDBQ is also used to assess consump-
tion of and sugar-sweetened beverages.76 Binge eating, 
characterised by a high frequency of consuming unusu-
ally large amounts of food and feeling a loss of control, is 
assessed using the Eating Disorder Diagnostic Scale.80 For 
pragmatic reasons, we did not use longer food behaviour 
questionnaires or 24-hour dietary recalls due to their 
time-intensiveness.
Physical activity: walking and moderate-to-vigorous 
intensity physical activity (MVPA) are measured using the 
International Physical Activity Questionnaire short form 
(IPAQ-SF). The IPAQ is well established in the public 
health literature as a valid and reliable physical activity 
assessment tool.81 82 For the duration of the study, partici-
pants wear a commercially available fitness tracker (Fitbit 
Alta HR), which has pedometer and accelerometer func-
tions. The validity of similar activity tracker models for 
assessing MVPA has been established against an acceler-
ometer criterion, with results ranging from near perfect 
correlation to overestimation of MVPA values.83 Fitbit 
algorithms take into account the Alta HR’s accelerometer 
movement and heart rate function, applying minute-by-
minute metabolic equivalents to estimate activity intensity. 
In 2015, Fitbit improved their algorithm to more closely 
align with 2008 physical activity guidelines for adults63 so 
that moderate-to-vigorous intensity activity minutes must 
occur in bouts of at least 10 min for a minute to be clas-
sified as an ‘active minute’. Therefore, ≥150 Fitbit ‘active 
minutes’ per week are considered an approximation of 
the recommended ≥150 min of MVPA per week.
RAs instruct participants to wear their Fitbit device 
at all times, except during bathing and swimming. RAs 
demonstrate how to charge the device and sync it with 
a smartphone, thereby allowing physical activity data to 
be uploaded to Fitabase. Fitabase is an independent affil-
iate of Fitbit that allows researchers to centrally access 
data from Fitbit wearable devices. A participant is consid-
ered to have worn their device on any given day if they 
accumulate >500 steps. Participants considered adherent 
accumulate ≥150 active minutes per week in the 28 days 
prior to their study visits. For participants who do not 
have a smartphone or computer, the RA syncs the Fitbit 
during study visits, allowing data stored on the device in 
the previous 30 days to be uploaded.
Adherence to weight management programme 
participation and self-monitoring weight and diet: to 
assess past-month participation in a recommended 
weight management programme, participants who report 
attending a programme in the previous month are asked 
how many sessions (1–5+) they attended and to provide 
approved documentation of attendance at each session. 
Based on thresholds established in previous studies,20 58 
participants considered adherent attend a session on-site 
at least twice in the previous month, or at least 50% of 
sessions offered by the programme (whichever is greater), 
and provide documentation during their study visit. To 
measure past-month adherence to self-monitoring strate-
gies, participants who report recording their weight and 
diet in the previous month are asked how many days in 
a typical week (1–5+) they did so, and then to provide 
weight and food records. Similar to thresholds identified 
in previous studies,84–86 participants considered adherent 
weigh themselves ≥3 days per week in the previous month 
and record what and how much they eat ≥5 days per week 
and provide records during their study visit.
Theoretical indicators of health behaviour change: 
several theoretical constructs inform the design of this 
intervention. We use established instruments to assess 
changes in the following: (1) self-efficacy to resist over-
eating (Weight Efficacy Lifestyle Questionnaire short 
form87) and engage in regular physical activity,88 (2) 
outcome expectations for weight loss and physical 
activity89 and (3) intrinsic motivation for weight loss 
programme participation, self-monitoring (Treatment 
Self-Regulation Questionnaire90) and physical activity 
(Behavioral Regulation in Exercise Questionnaire91). 
These constructs will be considered as potential media-
tors of the effects of the intervention on health behaviour 
change.
Medical history and healthcare utilisation: we use the 
EHR, administrative databases, baseline chart abstrac-
tion and survey items adapted from the NHANES 
Medical Conditions Survey and Cardiovascular Disease 
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Questionnaire92 to obtain: (1) discharge diagnoses 
and comorbidities, (2) length of stay, (3) medications 
prescribed, (4) out-of-pocket expenditures for health-
care services and (5) number of outpatient visits, emer-
gency department visits, and hospitalisations that occur 
in the 6 months prior to enrolment and within 1 year after 
enrolment.
Financial well-being: the extent to which a participant’s 
financial status contributes to their sense of financial 
security and well-being is captured using the five-item 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Financial Well-
being Scale.93 Because adults with lower incomes may be 
more responsive to financial incentives,22 higher levels 
of financial distress may also identify participants with a 
greater likelihood of weight loss in response to financial 
incentives.94 We measure financial well-being at baseline 
and follow-up to assess for this potential effect, because 
its presence would have implications for the development 
of incentive interventions that address socioeconomic 
disparities.95
Alcohol and tobacco use: the Alcohol Use Disorders 
Identification Test Consumption, an effective screening 
tool among primary care patients, is administered at 
screening and 12 months to assess the extent to which 
a participant is at risk for alcohol misuse based on 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM–5) criteria (ie, score >8).96 The participant’s 
history and current frequency and duration of cigarette 
and e-cigarette smoking are assessed using items adapted 
from the California Tobacco Survey.97
Resource utilisation measures: we measure RA time 
spent obtaining biometric measurements, providing 
education and resources, confirming programme partic-
ipation, food journal use and physical activity minutes, 
and administering incentives. While research-related 
costs are not included in our economic analysis, the cost 
of performing activities like measurements would be 
incurred if the programme is disseminated, since these 
types of activities must be performed to confirm eligibility 
for financial incentives.
Demographic characteristics/covariates: covariates 
include but are not limited to age, gender, race/ethnicity, 
education level, acculturation, marital status, employ-
ment status, household composition, use of technology, 
walking limitations and chronic conditions/disease.
statistical analysis
Descriptive analysis: we will use descriptive statistics 
(mean, SD, median, IQR and frequency distribution) to 
summarise baseline demographic, socioeconomic and 
clinical information to characterise the study population. 
We will summarise all outcomes of interest by study visits 
and by study arms. Graphic displays, such as boxplots and 
histograms, will be used to inspect the variable distribu-
tions and identify possible outliers.
Analysis of weight loss outcomes: to examine the effec-
tiveness of the intervention on ≥5% wt loss, we will use 
generalised mixed-effect models for repeated measures 
as the main inferential analytic framework. In addition 
to treatment, time and treatment–time interaction, the 
models will include randomisation stratification vari-
ables of study site and participant’s incentive preference 
as fixed effects. The participant will be included as the 
random effect to account for within-subject correlation. 
Appropriate contrast will be used to provide estimates 
and comparisons of outcomes between intervention 
groups. We will consider variable transformation, such 
as log-transformation, if the distribution is skewed and 
normality distribution assumption is imperative. All anal-
ysis will follow the intention-to-treat principle, all tests will 
be two sided and Bonferroni correction will be applied 
for multiple comparisons among study arms. We will 
analyse goal-directed indicators (weight management 
programme attendance, self-monitoring, physical activity 
and healthy eating) and secondary outcomes (mean 
weight change, waist circumference, blood pressure and 
quality of life) similarly to our primary outcome.
We will handle missing data, whether due to missed 
visits or early dropout and loss to follow-up, by the mixed 
effects models in the main analysis, which assume that the 
missing data mechanisms are ‘missing at random’. Pattern 
mixture models, which allow missing not-at-random data, 
will be carried out as a missing data sensitivity analysis. In 
particular, we will impute the missing data according to 
the worst-case scenario that there is no intervention effect 
and all missing data follow the distribution of observed 
data in the control arm.
Cost-effectiveness: we will estimate the cost of the 
intervention to help guide employers and policymakers 
considering adopting the programme and to provide 
inputs for our cost-effectiveness analysis, while adhering 
to recommendations of the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness 
in Health and Medicine.98 We will estimate the return on 
investment of our financial incentives intervention from 
the perspective of the healthcare system (hospitalisa-
tions, ambulatory care and medications) on a per-patient 
basis, assuming that a healthcare system would admin-
ister the programme. We include a return on investment 
analysis because prior research has shown that providing 
return on investment may influence the adoption and 
sustainability of health improvement programmes by 
healthcare organisations.47 Using a timeline of 5–10 
years,47 we will determine costs by: (1) multiplying 
staff or employee wages (based on US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics values99) by the projected time they spend on 
programme administration, such as obesity weigh-ins 
and confirmation of weight loss programme participa-
tion100; (2) using the Red Book to estimate medication 
costs for hypertension, diabetes and other conditions, 
based on average wholesale prices101; and (3) estimating 
bulk purchase prices for other physical materials given 
to patients with obesity. We have applied these methods 
to prior economic evaluations.38 102–108 Prior research 
suggests that private health plans and corporations use 
a shorter return on investment time horizon (eg, 5–10 
years) for decision making; however, it is important to 
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note that some health improvement programmes may 
require longer time horizons for economic benefits to 
accrue.
Resources consumed in programme activities include 
personnel time, printed materials, postage, telephone 
use and other miscellaneous items. We will estimate 
personnel time using tracking sheets and/or reports 
made by study staff and carefully document other mate-
rials used to deliver the intervention. These logs will 
include information about how the resources contributed 
to delivering our intervention, so that we can distinguish 
fixed costs (costs that do not change with the number 
of participants in the programme) from variable costs 
(costs that increase with the number of participants in 
the programme), an important distinction in economic 
evaluation.109 Costs associated with research assessments 
(eg, screening, randomisation and questionnaires) will 
not be included.
We will estimate return on investment using the 
difference between the value of financial incentives 
provided and incremental healthcare costs or savings, 
comparing the outcome-based financial incentives arm 
to the resources-only arm, and the goal-directed arm to 
the outcome-based arm. To project long-term return on 
investment (using a lifetime horizon), we will modify an 
existing Markov model that we previously developed of 
treatment interventions for patients with hypertension 
(cardiometabolic risks incorporated in this model reflect 
risks faced by obese patients). This model currently uses a 
10-year time horizon.
We will also estimate the cost-effectiveness of the inter-
vention (cost per pound of weight loss and cost per life-
year gained) using the ratio of the difference in costs 
between each of the intervention and control arms to the 
difference in 5% wt loss attainment rates between each of 
the intervention and control arms. The general equation 
for a cost-effectiveness ratio (CER) is110 shown in figure 3, 
where i is the i-th time period of a patient’s life, cost 
is determined by resources used in the provision of 
weight loss resources and support in the intervention 
and control arms and effectiveness is measured by the 
primary outcome and quality of life (PROMIS-29). Costs 
will be determined as described above. In addition, to 
estimate potential cost-offsets, we will use data from our 
survey’s sociodemographic questions about employment 
to evaluate changes in productivity. We will also perform 
non-parametric bootstrapping with 1000 random samples 
from our study arms to estimate CIs for CERs, using the 
bias-corrected percentile method described by Efron and 
others.111–115 The cost and effectiveness outcomes from 
each bootstrap sample will be plotted on a cost-effective-
ness plane.
Patient and public involvement
We sought feedback from patients enrolled in a prior 
incentives study on their preferences for an incentive 
structure (ie, goal-directed vs outcome-based incentives 
for a preventive health behaviour) and used this feed-
back to inform FIReWoRk’s framework and intervention 
design. Patients were not involved in the recruitment and 
conduct of the study. We assess the burden of the inter-
vention among FIReWoRk participants during an exit 
interview. We will make a summary of the results available 
to the public after the study’s conclusion and publication 
of the primary outcomes.
dIsCussIon
Innovation
In this paper, we outline the protocol and rationale for 
the FIReWoRk study. FIReWoRk is innovative for several 
reasons. First, financial incentive interventions for 
preventive health have primarily targeted outcomes.42 
A few recent weight loss trials have demonstrated 
effectiveness using a combination of goal-directed and 
outcome-based incentives versus a non-incentive compar-
ison.36 116 117 The few trials comparing goal-directed 
versus outcome-based financial incentives for weight 
loss were underpowered118 or preceded behavioural 
economics.119–122 Testing goal-directed versus outcome-
based incentives is important because it directly 
addresses outstanding questions about how to structure 
incentive interventions optimally, while also yielding 
insights into the value of incentive-based versus non-in-
centive-based strategies for behaviour change. A recent 
cluster-randomised trial123 compared the effectiveness 
of earning up to US$310 over 16 weeks for attending 
Diabetes Prevention Program sessions versus for losing 
weight versus a combination of the two incentive types. 
All groups achieved moderate weight loss at 16 weeks, 
though no differences in weight loss were observed 
between the three intervention arms. Participants in 
the goal-directed arm were more likely to meet their 
programme attendance goal than either the outcome-
based or combined incentive arms. FIReWoRk expands 
on this recent study by providing monthly primary 
care clinic-based check-in visits, incentivising multiple 
behavioural goals, administering larger and more imme-
diate payments (<48 hours vs <2 months) and assessing 
short-term weight maintenance at 3 months and 
6 months postintervention. We hypothesise that goal-di-
rected incentives will lead to greater and more sustained 
weight loss than outcome-based incentives or the provi-
sion of behaviour change resources alone. If confirmed, 
this finding would reinforce the importance of long-
standing behavioural approaches to treating obesity and 
other chronic health conditions with effective, goal-di-
rected strategies (eg, self-monitoring for weight loss, 
use of counselling and nicotine replacement therapy 
for smoking cessation). However, if FIReWoRk demon-
strates that outcome-based incentives are more effective Figure 3 General equation for cost-effectiveness ratio.
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than goal-directed incentives or resources alone, this 
finding would support the need to: (1) explore the 
role of outcome-based incentives in maintaining weight 
loss and (2) make more rigorous comparisons between 
economically sustainable outcome-based incentive strat-
egies and conventional, non-incentive-based approaches 
to treating obesity and chronic health conditions.
Measuring participants' weight at 12 months after 
enrolment—6 months after removal of incentives—will 
provide preliminary insight into the durability of finan-
cial incentives for weight loss. Understanding the dura-
bility of financial incentives is directly relevant to ongoing 
debates about the effect of incentives on intrinsic versus 
extrinsic motivation and patient decision making about 
preventive health. Researchers have raised concerns 
that financial incentives may crowd out intrinsic motiva-
tion,124 125 though some have noted that levels of intrinsic 
motivation for activities we incentive may already be low, 
leaving little motivation at risk for crowd out.126 The 
possibility that losing weight may itself increase self-effi-
cacy and intrinsic motivation127 further complicates the 
intrinsic-extrinsic motivation dynamic in the context of 
weight loss.
FIReWoRk is also innovative because it leverages 
existing clinic and community resources. The USPSTF 
recommends that all patients with obesity receive an 
intensive multicomponent behavioural lifestyle interven-
tion,11 but most healthcare centres lack weight manage-
ment programmes. Even when health systems have their 
own programmes (eg, the Veteran’s Affairs MOVE! 
Program), patients often do not live close enough to 
attend regularly. Thus, we collaborate with WW Interna-
tional, Inc because WW Freestyle is a ubiquitous resource 
in the community with multiple studio locations.
A third innovative quality of FIReWoRk is its use of 
Fitbit wearable devices and Fitabase to facilitate the provi-
sion of financial incentives. Fitbit technology provides an 
interface we use to verify all participants’ physical activity 
goal attainment, allowing us to provide timely incentive 
payments to participants in the goal-directed arm. These 
data, which include step counts, heart rate, activity inten-
sity, energy expenditure and sleep, will also allow us to 
richly evaluate how different biometric measures influ-
ence obesity and weight loss outcomes. We chose not to 
target wearable tracking of physical activity with goal-di-
rected incentives given that such self-monitoring of phys-
ical activity alone may not be effective for weight loss.128 
Instead, participants must meet public health guide-
lines for moderate-to-vigorous physical activity to receive 
incentives. We considered adopting other technological 
innovations to enhance our ability to administer incen-
tives immediately, including scales that wirelessly transmit 
weight data. However, our concern with using some of 
these technologies in an incentive intervention is that 
remote monitoring that cannot readily be verified may 
tempt some participants to misrepresent their weight or 
other information. However, even these obstacles can be 
attenuated or overcome with technology. For example, 
video monitoring could be embedded into remote 
weigh-ins.
A fourth innovative component of FIReWoRk is its 
explicit focus on the effects of incentives on financial 
well-being. To increase our ability to detect such an 
effect, we are enrolling low-income populations. Low-in-
come patients may be more likely to respond to incen-
tives,22 129 and their socioeconomic status suggests that 
the marginal benefit of gains in health and income may 
be greater than those experienced by similarly obese 
patients with greater economic resources. Any potential 
benefits to financial well-being would therefore have 
implications for the development of incentive interven-
tions that address socioeconomic disparities. Because of 
its design, FIReWoRk may also contribute to the growing 
literature on the effects of incentives to induce personal 
investments in health and social capital through activities 
such as acquiring vaccinations, saving money or enrolling 
in school.95 Several published trials of income support 
sample low-income populations, and some have yielded 
promising results with benefits extending into health and 
social domains.95 130
Finally, FIReWoRk leverages important constructs from 
behavioural sciences, but these constructs represent only 
a fraction of those embedded into prior trials. Effective 
interventions have applied such constructs131 132; however, 
it is worth noting that incorporating these theories does 
not ensure that an intervention will be successful.133 We 
are exploring the application of broader behavioural 
concepts in future work. In particular, we are interested 
in leveraging the power of social norms, peer compari-
sons and self-image to increase weight loss.134
limitations
A major challenge of our intervention design is that simul-
taneous use of multiple weight loss techniques limits our 
ability to determine which components of the interven-
tion most effectively promote weight loss. However, using 
ad hoc analyses, we will be able to identify which compo-
nents are associated with the highest rates of response 
to incentive payments. All participants receive substan-
tial resources, including a 1-year commercial weight 
loss programme membership (mean 6-month weight 
loss 4.6 kg),20 which may reduce marginal sensitivity to 
the effects of incentives over resources alone. However, 
regular programme attendance, which is necessary for 
weight loss success,20 is often low, and goal-directed 
financial incentives have been shown to increase weight 
loss programme participation in real-world settings.123 
Adherence to monthly check-in visits is also of concern, 
so participants are compensated $20 to promote reten-
tion and offset transportation costs to study visits. These 
smaller payments may also reduce our ability to detect the 
marginal impact of the incentives through their income 
effect, though this effect is likely negligible. The compar-
ative effectiveness of goal-directed versus outcome-based 
incentives may favour goal-directed incentives if the 
total incentive value were more modest than $750. This 
13Jay M, et al. BMJ Open 2019;9:e025278. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-025278
Open access
possibility is an appropriate subject for future investi-
gation, assuming that incentives that are more modest 
remain sufficiently large to promote weight loss. By 
setting the reward amount equally across both incentive 
arms, cost-effectiveness may favour outcome-based incen-
tives, particularly if weight loss is similar between arms. In 
the goal-directed arm, participants may inflate their goal 
attainment in order to increase their incentive amount, 
though we expect our objective goal verification process 
to mitigate most of this risk. Several of our measures are 
self-report, which can introduce social desirability bias 
in patients’ responses. RAs are not blinded to partici-
pants’ intervention group when administering weight 
and survey measures at 6, 9 and 12 months, which could 
result in measurements that inadvertently favour the RAs 
preferred participants or incentive strategy.
Our recruitment strategies may entice patients who 
are more highly motivated to lose weight than a truly 
representative sample of primary care patients, thus 
overestimating intervention effects on weight loss. We 
also screen patients for eligibility based on neighbour-
hood-level rather than individual or household income, 
which precludes enrolment of low-income patients living 
in higher income areas and may affect the generalisability 
of our sample.
Public health and policy considerations
We view FIReWoRk’s major limitation in the context of 
public policy to be uncertainty about the sustainability 
and acceptability of financial incentives for weight loss in 
individuals with obesity. The use of financial incentives to 
improve health can be controversial.23 Sustainability and 
acceptability largely relate to: (1) economic sustainability, 
in terms of identifying sources of funding, and (2) ethics, 
that is, public perceptions of the fairness and appropri-
ateness of financial incentives.131 135–137 Despite these 
concerns, some decision makers have already adopted 
effective financial incentive programmes.138 For example, 
the NHS Tayside programme in Scotland provided preg-
nant smokers with support and £50 per month in shop-
ping vouchers for negative carbon monoxide breath 
tests.139 Australia addressed low rates of childhood vacci-
nation by linking eligibility for social security payments, 
childcare rebates and other payments to immunisation 
status.140 141 In 2015, CVS Health launched a financial 
incentive programme to help employees quit smoking, 
based on the design of a successful randomised trial.142 143 
A number of health insurance companies and other work-
places have also adopted incentive programmes to improve 
health. Nonetheless, acceptability is an important consid-
eration when designing and implementing financial 
incentive programmes for weight loss, and even effective 
programmes have encountered resistance.144
Our view is that challenges related to sustainability and 
acceptability are surmountable and that we can design 
incentive programmes in a manner that supports public 
perceptions of fairness.145 146 For example, one approach 
is to broaden the number of individuals eligible for 
incentives, while tailoring behavioural targets and incen-
tive amounts to ensure that individuals with greatest need 
benefit most.147 148 In terms of funding for incentives, 
early investment in selective programmes may be offset 
by reductions in future healthcare cost. Some political 
philosophies may also be receptive to shifting investments 
from public programmes to more targeted programmes 
that directly benefit individuals. FIReWoRk does not 
address population-based approaches to weight loss, such 
as reducing sugar-sweetened beverage sales or increasing 
opportunities for physical activity in the built environ-
ment—which may ultimately be most cost-effective—but 
rather focuses on individual decision making.
summary and significance
FIReWoRk responds to gaps in existing evidence by exam-
ining the comparative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
of goal-directed versus outcome-based financial incen-
tives for weight loss in socioeconomically disadvantaged 
patients with obesity. We anticipate that the results of this 
study will inform the design of scalable financial incen-
tive programmes to address obesity in public and private 
health systems.
trial status
FIReWoRk began enrolment in November 2017. We 
expect to complete enrolment in June 2020 and complete 
the outcome assessment between June and August 2021. 
Enrolment and study execution have required close 
collaboration between investigators, research staff and 
partners at our multiple clinical sites.
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